Introduction

The hypothesis that human cognition may be well characterized as a set of Bayesian computations has been the topic of considerable debate over the last two decades. Recently, critics have argued that this hypothesis is either unlikely to be true or otherwise too unconstrained to be particularly useful for explaining cognition (e.g., Bowers & Davis, 2012), whereas proponents have defended their position by stating that the Bayesian perspective has been misunderstood, is not necessarily in conflict with other perspectives on cognition, and can still be explanatorily useful as a framework for cognitive science even if underconstrained in many ways (e.g., Griffiths, Chater, Norris, & Pouget, 2012). Our position in this debate is that both sides of this debate may be right as well as wrong: Proponents may be right that the Bayesian perspective has something uniquely useful to bring to cognitive science (and then the critics are wrong in their denial of this); yet, the critics may be right that cognitive theories are explanatorily useful only if properly constrained (and then proponents are wrong in their denial of this).

With this perspective in mind, we wish to move the debate forward in a constructive way by bringing in new perspectives and proposing novel constraints that can be exploited for purposes of improving the explanatory values and virtues of Bayesian explanations of cognition. Specifically, with this symposium we aim to focus on how constraints on Bayesian explanations can be exploited in ways that are yet underrepresented and underexplored.

The symposium brings together researchers from various disciplines, contributing a variety of perspectives on how Bayesian explanations can be fruitfully constrained, drawing on theories, analyses, and results from philosophy of science, cognitive neuroscience, information theory, machine learning, and theoretical computer science.

Keywords: Bayesian inference, levels of explanation, constraints, tractability, coherent infomax, computational complexity, unification, philosophy of science

A complexity-theoretic perspective on the preconditions for Bayesian tractability

Johan Kwisthout (joint work with Iris van Rooij)

Many Bayesian computations have been proven to be computationally intractable (NP-hard) for unconstrained input domains, even if only an approximate solution is sought. Informally, this means that computations postulated by Bayesian models can take astronomical amounts of time for their completion even for realistic sized inputs. This property seems to be in strong contrast with the ease and speed with which humans can typically make the inferences that are modeled by Bayesian models. Some critics of the Bayesian approach have taken this property of Bayesian models as a reason to reject the entire approach (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008). In contrast, I propose that it means that tractability forms a useful constraint on Bayesian explanations of cognition. In this talk, I will elucidate the use of complexity-theoretic concepts and techniques for making Bayesian models meet the tractability constraint, building on known results from theoretical computer science (e.g., Kwisthout, 2011). I will furthermore report on recent complexity results that have lead to novel hypotheses about the conditions under which Bayesian inferences can be tractably approximated (Kwisthout & van Rooij, 2013).

Bayesian cognitive science, unification, and explanation

Matteo Colombo (joint work with Stephan Hartmann)

A recurrent claim is that the greatest value of studying cognitive phenomena such as perception, action, categorization, and decision-making, within the Bayesian framework consists in its unifying power. Several Bayesian
cognitive scientists, however, implicitly assume that unification is obviously linked to explanatory power. But this link is not obvious (e.g., Morrison, 2000).

A crucial feature of adequate explanations in the cognitive sciences is that they reveal aspects of the causal structure of the mechanism that produces the phenomenon to be explained. The kind of unification afforded by the Bayesian framework to cognitive science does not necessarily reveal the causal structure of a mechanism (cf. Colombo & Seriès, 2012). Bayesian unification is the product of the mathematics rather than of a causal hypothesis concerning how different cognitive phenomena are brought about by a single type of mechanism. Nonetheless, Bayesian unification can place fruitful constraints on causal mechanical explanation, which will be elucidated in this talk.

**Bayesian modeling and heuristic strategies for model-development**

Carlos Zednik (joint work with Frank Jäkel)

It is generally agreed that Bayesian models in cognitive science operate at Marr’s computational level of analysis (Marr, 1982). Unfortunately, it remains unclear exactly how the computational, algorithmic, and implementation levels are related.

This talk explicates inter-level relationships in terms of heuristic strategies for model-development (Zednik, in press). Specifically, Bayesian computational-level models play the heuristic role of suggesting possible algorithms to compute a particular function, and of suggesting particular ways of delineating and interpreting the components of a physical mechanism. In turn, algorithmic and mechanistic models specify memory, time, and resource limitations that constrain the cognitive tasks described by Bayesian models. In contrast to the view that Bayesian computational-level modeling is independent of low-level considerations, on this view the development of Bayesian models is constrained by, and at the same time itself constrains, the development of models at lower levels of analysis.

**Neuronal inference from the perspective of Jaynes’s probability theory and the coherent infomax objective**

William A. Phillips

In support of the ‘Bayesian’ perspective on cognition, I will agree that the adaptively organized complexity of life, and particularly mental life, depends on inductive inference. I will put five major caveats on this support, however. First, this perspective should be based not on Bayes theorem alone but on the logic of probability theory as developed most rigorously and extensively by the statistical physicist Edwin T. Jaynes (1998/2003). Interpreting probabilities as quantifying uncertainty he showed that optimal inference rests on a few requirements, or ‘desiderata’, and he developed maximum entropy methods for justifiably allocating prior probabilities given only what is known. Second, Jaynes’s desiderata can only be met in simple cases. Third, contextual modulation operates via likelihoods, not priors (Kay & Phillips, 2010). Fourth, inferences are the common currency of feed-forward transmission, not prediction errors. Fifth, modulatory interactions within hierarchical levels are at least as crucial as those between levels.

I will also note that, in addition to the constraints imposed by Jaynes’s desiderata, the use of prior event frequency is constrained by the curse-of-dimensionality. It becomes rapidly less useful as dimensionality of the event space increases because the number of possible locations within it then increases exponentially.

Finally, I will briefly outline the possibility that functional specializations combined with various cellular and local-circuit mechanisms for context-sensitive gain-control have evolved within mammalian cortex to restrict the problems to be solved by neuronal inference to what is feasible within the above constraints, as formulated using information theoretic concepts in the theory of coherent infomax (Phillips, 2012).

**References**


